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Recent Proposals and Legislative
Efforts to Limit Three-Judge
Court Jurisdiction
Sidney B. Jacoby*
Professor Jacoby suggests guidelines for a reorganization of the three-
judge court system. He analyzes the comprehensive proposals submitted
by the ALI and the attempts to enact these proposals into law. After re-
viewing specific instances where the jurisdiction of three-judge courts has
been limited to date, the author concludes that future changes should be
modeled after the Antitrust Procedures and Penalities Act.
1. INTRODUCTION
p ROPOSALS TO CURTAIL federal jurisdiction have abounded
in recent years. The reason is that the workload of the federal
courts has continually expanded, not only because of added business
resulting from a growing population, but also because of the substan-
tial increase in federal criminal cases, habeas corpus, civil rights and,
in some districts, securities litigation.'
The most comprehensive and far-reaching study of this problem
within the last decades was the Study of the Division of Jurisdic-
tion between State and Federal Courts, finally adopted by the
American Law Institute in 1968, and published in 1969.2 The Study
was discussed in a series of articles,3 sometimes encountering
* The Author: Sidney B. Jacoby (LL.B., Columbia University; J.D. Berlin Law
School) is the John C. Hutchins Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University
and has been a Professor of Law at Georgetown University. His teaching specialties
include Civil Procedure, Government Litigation, Federal Jurisdiction, and Compara-
tive Law. He is admitted to the New York, District of Columbia, and Ohio Bars and,
prior to entering full-time teaching, served as a government attorney with various
federal agencies including the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Samuel R. Tillett,
a second-year student at Case Western Reserve University Law School, in the
preparation of this article.
1. See (Chief Judge) H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 15 (1973).
2. ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (May 1968 Official Draft) [hereinafter cited as STUDY].
3. Burdick, Diversity Jurisdiction Under the American Law Institute Proposals:
Its Purpose and Effect on State and Federal Courts, 48 N.D.L. REV. 1 (1971); Field,
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts-A Summary of American Law Institute Proposals,
46 F.R.D. 141 (1969); Field, Proposals on Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L.
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strong opposition.4 The Study completely redrafted a substantial
portion of Title 28 of the United States Code (Judicial Code). Here,
we will be primarily concerned with the proposals to limit the insti-
tution of three-judge courts, but the Study, of course, had a much
broader scope.
II. THE STUDY
The Study recommends a complete overhaul of the federal ju-
dicial system. While many of the Study's proposals would actually
increase the federal workload, 5 several of them would result in a
reduction. The largest decrease would probably be brought about
by the proposal in the diversity field to bar a plaintiff from bringing
suit in a federal court in his home state on the ground that his ad-
versary is an out-of-stater.6 Similarly, a business enterprise which
maintained a "local establishment" in a state for over two years
would be precluded from invoking federal diversity jurisdiction in any
action arising out of the activities of that -establishment.7
These proposals on diversity juirisdiction clearly are the most
prominent provisions of the Study. Nevertheless, recent legislative
events seem to indicate that another proposal may be of greater
REV. 669 (1965); Fraser, Proposed Revision of the Jurisdiction of the Federal District
Courts, 8 VALPARAISO L. REV. 189 (1974); Wright, Federal Question Jurisdiction,
17 S.C.L. REV. 660 (1965); Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American
Law Institute Proposals, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (1969); Note, Analysis of the
ALl's Approach to the State-Federal Jurisdictional Dilemma, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 287
(1972).
4. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pts. 1-2), 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 268 (1968-69); Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Diversity
Jurisdiction, 2 TRIAL, Apr.-May 1966, at 30; Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-
An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. REv. 677 (1965); Frank, For Maintaining Diversity
Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past,
Present, and Future, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1964); Wright, The Federal Courts and
the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 317 (1967); Note,
ALl Proposals to Expand Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1109
(1964).
5. Thus, proposed § 1312 of the Study permits removal when a federal defense
or counterclaim is interposed, and proposed § 1311 of the Study, now 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1970), abolishes the requirement of a particular amount in federal question
cases. Both of these proposals would lead to an increase in the federal workload.
Section 1311, in particular, would probably let certain types of welfare cases into the
federal courts that are not presently admitted. In addition, proposed § 1304(b) of
the Study would expand the diversity area by permitting an out-of-state defendant
to remove the case even though he is joined with a non-diverse defendant or with a
defendant not consenting to removal.
6. Id. § 1302(a); cf. id. § 1302(c). See also id., Commentary app. B, at 468.
7. Id. § 1302(b); id. § 1302(b), Commentary, at 125-29; see Moore & Weck-
stein, supra note 4, at 14; cf. STUDY § 1302(c) (excluding the out-of-state com-
muter).
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immediate significance. This one revolves around the proposed
limitations on the use of three-judge courts. If some characteri-
zation is permitted, limiting proposals which deal with the "orga-
nization of the federal court system" seem to find easier acceptance
than proposals which deal with "substantive limitations of federal
jurisdiction."
The Study contains a detailed provision8 dealing with the re-
quirement of a three-judge court when an injunction or declaratory
judgment is sought against a state officer on the ground that his acts
are contrary to the Constitution of the United States. Unlike
the interpretations given to present 28 U.S.C. section 2281 (1970),'
proposed section 1374 would extend the three-judge requirement to
declaratory judgments. Also, the language of proposed section 1374,
which mandates a three-judge court whenever the state officer's acts
or threatened acts are "taken under authority of a generally appli-
cable State statute, administrative order, or constitutional provi-
sion" 0 and are contrary to the Constitution of the United States,
would differ from the rule laid down in Phillips v. United States"
8. STUDY § 1374.
9. Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934
(1974). In support of its affirmance of the district judge's refusal to convene a three-
judge court, the Whatley opinion, 482 F.2d at 1231, cites Mitchell v. Donovan, 398
U.S. 427 (1970). Mitchell dealt with the refusal to empanel a three-judge court in a
declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970). In any event, the
Supreme Court has refused to assume jurisdiction in an appeal from a declaratory
judgment of a three-judge court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). See
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1970); Gunn v. University Comm. to End the War,
399 U.S. 383, 391 (1969) (White, J., concurring). At the same time, the Supreme
Court has left the question of whether the three-judge court was properly convened
to the appellate court within whose circuit the district court lay. Gernstein v. Coe,
417 U.S. 279 (1974); cf. Mitchell v. Donovan, supra; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1960) (cases
dealing with the comparable provision of § 2282). It should be noted that in 1910,
at the time of the original enactment of the equivalent of § 2281, the remedy of
declaratory judgments did not yet exist. The decision to subject declaratory judg-
ment applications to the same three-judge requirement as injunctions was made by
the American Law Institute because the same compliance is expected with a
declaratory judgment as with an injunction and because both may be given res
judicata effect. STUDY § 1374, Commentary, at 322-23. For a forceful reaffirma-
tion of these principles, see the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 476 (1974), eloquently answering Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's indecisive separate opinion in the case, id. at 478. See Comment,
Federal Courts, Declaratory Judgment, 20 VILL. L. REV. 241, 253 (1974); Note,
Federal Jurisdiction-Steffel v. Thompson, 6 LOYOLA U.L.J. 508, 523 & n.120 (1975).
10. STUDY § 1374.
11. 312 U.S. 246 (1941); accord, Native Am. Church of Navajoland, Inc. v.
Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 405 U.S. 901 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Glenwal
Dev. Corp. v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. P.R. 1972); Starr v. Parks, 345 F. Supp.
795, 798 (D. Md. 1972); Moyer v. Nelson, 324 F. Supp. 1224, 1229 (D. Iowa 1971);
[Vol. 26:32
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and Ex parte Bransford.'2 In those cases, the Court held that a
determination by a single judge is sufficient when the challenge is
not to the statute authorizing the officer to act, but only to his partic-
ular exercise of statutory powers.
13
The principal modification advocated by the Study is the aboli-
tion of any equivalent of present 28 U.S.C. section 2282 (first en-
acted in 1937) which requires a three-judge court whenever an in-
junction is sought against the enforcement of a federal statute.
The rationale for this modification is that in a true system of fed-
eralism the "conditions that gave rise to the 1937 legislation no longer
exist-if, indeed, they still existed when it was passed. 14  While the
Study did not seek repeal of federal statutes 15 which require three-
judge courts in special areas, it is, in fact, in this field of special
statutes that legislative reform has commenced.
1 6
Proposed sections 1375 and 1376 would regulate the proceed-
ings of three-judge courts. Subsection (a) of section 1375 would
specify the authority of the single district judge-a power not speci-
fied but assumed under present law17 -to determine that three judges
are not required. A more problematic issue is whether the chief
judge of the circuit, upon receipt of a request by a district judge,
should make an independent determination of the necessity of em-
panelling a three-judge court.1 The Study declined to take a spe-
Bistrick v. University of S.C., 319 F. Supp. 193, 196 (D.S.C. 1970); cf. Board of
Regents v. New Left Edue. Project, 404 U.S. 541, 543 (1972).
12. 310 U.S. 354 (1940). See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 457 n.7 (1973);
Native Am. Church of Navajoland, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 405 U.S. at 901;
United States v. Christian Echoes Ministry, 404 U.S. 561, 565 (1972); Redfearn v.
Delaware Republican State Comm., 502 F.2d 1123, 1131 (3d Cir. 1974) (dissenting
opinion); Moyer v. Nelson, 324 F. Supp. at 1229.
13. STUDY § 1374, Commentary, at 321.
14. Three-judge courts were believed to be a way of insuring informed and
thoughtful treatment of federal statutes. Today, however, as the Study points out,
there are other procedural provisions of the 1937 Judiciary Act that protect federal
legislation from ill-considered invalidation by federal district courts, and the three-
judge courts are no longer necessary. STUDY 325.
15. Id. § 1374; id. § 1374, Note, at 53-54; id. § 1374, Commentary, at 324.
16. See text accompanying notes 70-122 infra.
17. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S.
512 (1973); Exparte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also Turner v. City of Memphis,
369 U.S. 350 (1962); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962). In Bailey, the
Court declared that no three-judge requirement exists "where prior decisions make
frivolous any claim that a state statute on its face is not unconstitutional." 369
U.S. at 33. Whatever the meaning of this principle may be, the Study advisedly left
the matter undetermined. STUDY § 1375(a), Commentary, at 326-27. Compare,
however, the interpretations of this principle in Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th
Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) and Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 131 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967).
18. Compare California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified School Dist.,
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cific stand on that issue but believed that under its proposed statu-
tory language the chief judge of the circuit would have a merely
ministerial duty when designating the two other judges.' 9 Proposed
section 1376 of the Study seeks to reform the present complex rules
on the appropriate means of obtaining review of a decision to em-
panel a three-judge court. The existing patterns of review are so
obscure that commentators have suggested that the wisest course is
to file appeal and mandamus proceedings for a single case simul-
taneously in the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.20
Subsection (a) clearly provides that the court of appeals shall
have jurisdiction to review decisions of district courts denying re-
quests for three-judge courts.2' Perhaps the most important proposal
is the last clause of proposed section 1374 that "a district court
of three judges shall not be convened unless the defendant files
a request for such a court within twenty days after the pleading
challenging his action is served upon him, or prior to hearing on
an application for a preliminary injunction, whichever is earlier,"
together with the provision in the third sentence of proposed sec-
tion 1376(a) that if no such timely request is made, "a single judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the case." These pro-
visions will abolish the doctrine that the requirement of a three-
judge court is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction (therefore non-
waivable) and will eliminate unnecessary litigation, e.g., the strange
result that the court of appeals, if it believes that it was error
for the single judge to act, must remand the case for trial by three
judges.22
333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Sinatra v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investiga-
tion, 311 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.J. 1970); Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 325
(E.D. Pa. 1965) with Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1968); Hargrave v.
McKinney, 302 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Fla. 1969); Smith v. Ladner, 260 F. Supp. 918
(S.D. Miss. 1966).
19. Proposed § 1375(a) provides that the single judge "shall, unless he determines
that three judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge," whereas with
respect to the chief judge, proposed § 1375(a) simply states that he "shall designate
two other judges." STUDY § 1375(a), Commentary, at 328-29.
20. See discussion on the present complex state of the law in STUDY § 1376(a),
Commentary, at 332-33.
21. Under present law the proper remedy is apparently mandamus to the Su-
preme Court. See Ex pane Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911). But see
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 100 n.19 (1974);
Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U.S. 427 (1967); Buchanan v. Rhodes, 385 U.S. 3
(1966); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 716 (1962);
Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957).
22. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 153 (1963); Borden Co. v.
Liddy, 309 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1962); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 50, at 190-91
(2d ed. 1970).
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Subsection (b) of proposed section 1376, first sentence, retains
the present rule that appeals from decisions of three-judge district
courts lie only to the Supreme Court.23  The second sentence pro-
vides that if the Supreme Court finds that a three-judge court was
not required, it may transfer the case to the court of appeals or it
may itself decide the appeal. The third sentence provides that when
an appeal is taken to the court of appeals but, in the opinion of
the court of appeals, should have been taken directly to the Supreme
Court, the court of appeals may certify24 the case to the Supreme
Court which shall determine the case.
Thus, the Study contains strong suggestions to curtail excessive
federal jurisdiction in the three-judge court field. We shall first
mention the legislative efforts to enact the proposals of the Ameri-
can Law Institute. Thereafter, reference will be made to similar
proposals likewise seeking to curtail federal jurisdiction by rear-
ranging the federal court system.
III. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ENACT THE
CODIFICATION PROPOSED BY THE STUDY
To date, proponents of the ALI proposals have been unable to
secure their enactment.25 In May 1971 Senator Quentin Burdick
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). Despite some doubts, the Study decided to retain the
institution of direct appeal to the Supreme Court from three-judge court decisions.
The additional workload on the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction created
thereby was believed not excessive since the Supreme Court frequently makes
summary dispositions of such cases on the jurisdictional statement without a plenary
hearing. As the Study stated, the cases under proposed section 1374 challenging
state statutes, "unlike Expediting Act cases, ordinarily turn on questions of law
rather than questions of fact, and there is no need for intermediate review to settle
the fact questions." STUDY § 1376(b), Commentary, at 335. For a discussion of the
problems of the Antitrust Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 28, 29 (1970), as amended, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 28, 29 (Supp. I, 1975), and the abolition of the three-judge procedure
by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 28, 29 (Supp. I, 1975),
see text accompanying notes 68-106 infra.
24. Of course, this proposed certification procedure is entirely different from the
present certification procedure, 28 U.S.C. .section 1254(3) (1970), under which a
court of appeals may certify to the Supreme Court a question of law "as to which
instructions are desired" and then the Supreme Court "may give binding instructions
or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in con-
troversy." In the infrequently used certification procedure of section 1254(3), the
Supreme Court possesses strictly discretionary power, while under the third sen-
tence of section 1376(b) the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seems "obligatory": the
Supreme Court "shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as if it had
been taken directly to that Court."
25. In the Foreword to the Study, Professor Wechsler, Director of the American
Law Institute, emphasized that the work of the Institute is completed with the
publication of the Official Draft of desirable legislation. He stated: "If efforts are to be
made to promote its enactment, others must assume the task." STUDY 13. See
1975]
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introduced a bill incorporating the actual text of all the ALI pro-
posals. The bill was called the "Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of
1971.,26 Hearings were held in 1971 and 1972 in the two sessions
of the 92d Congress. 27  The 1971 hearings dealt with several of the
areas covered in the Study: the topics of diversity jurisdiction, of
multi-party litigation, and of choice of law in the federal courts.
A series of prominent professors and practitioners testified at the
hearings. The record, totaling 633 pages, sets forth a number of
law review articles and extensive statistical studies in appendices.
A very large portion of the hearings was devoted to testimony ob-
jecting to the above-described severe limitations of diversity juris-
diction proposed by the Study. In 1972 hearings were held again,
this time on admiralty jurisdiction, the United States as a party,
general federal question jurisdiction, and three-judge courts. No
bill was adopted by the Senate in the 92d Congress.
Instead, S. 1876 was reintroduced, with substantial modifications,
by Senator Burdick on May 23, 1973.28 No hearings were held and
the Senate took no action on the revised S. 1876. As of the time
of this writing (July 1975), the bill has not been reintroduced in
the 94th Congress, but reintroduction is generally expected. 29  The
most significant revision in the three-judge field is the rewrite of
section 1374.30 The Study had required a three-judge court gener-
ally when an injunction or declaratory judgment was sought against
also H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 974 (2d ed. 1973).
26. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
27. Hearings On S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971-72).
28. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For a rather extensive description of
the revisions see 119 CONG. REC. 9637-40 (daily ed. May 23, 1973) (statement of
Senator Burdick).
29. Despite extensive testimony, relatively few changes were made in the gen-
eral diversity provisions, except that the general requirement of $10,000 in diversity
cases was raised to $15,000 (proposed section 1301(a)). The rule prohibiting the
invocation of diversity jurisdiction by a citizen of the State (S. 1876, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., § 1302(a) (1973)), the rule on "local establishment" (id. § 1302(b)) and
the provision on "commuters" (id. § 1302(c)) were left intact. See id. § 1302(c).
Many modifications were proposed with respect to federal question jurisdiction.
The chapter on the United States as a party was changed to some extent, particularly
with respect to the issue of counterclaims against the United States. The Study's
proposed chapter on multiparty-multistate diversity was eliminated, and some
changes were made in the sections on admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
It should be noted that recently a new bill, S. 537 of the 94th Congress, which
deals only with, and is restricted to limiting, three-judge court jurisdiction in a manner
similar to the Burdick Amendment of § 1374 of S. 1876 of the 93d Congress, has
taken substantial steps toward enactment.
30. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1374 (1973).
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a state officer on the ground of the unconstitutionality of his acts.
But Senator Burdick's special amendment requires a three-judge
court only when "an action is filed seeking congressional reappor-
tionment or the reapportionment of any statewide legislative
body. 31 Section 1374 of S. 1876, 93d Congress, was based upon the
hearings, but reads slightly differently: "[W]hen an action is filed
challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congres-
sional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative
body' 32 a three-judge court is required. In the hearings, the Bur-
dick substitute for the Study's section 1374 found the approval of
two judges testifying before the Committee. Judge J. Skelly Wright,
of the District of Columbia Circuit, approved it enthusiastically,
saying:
[I] certainly would believe that this is an area of great pub-
lic concern that continues to need the protection that three-
judge district courts were originally designed to give.
When we deal with redistricting of Congressmen, state-
wide redistricting, we have issues of such public impor-
tance that from the standpoint of public acceptance it is
quite appropriate that no one Federal judge set aside what
the Congress has done or what the State legislature has
done . . . .These cases, moreover, ordinarily present a
naked legal issue. The facts are pretty much statistical,
easily available; no trial-type procedure is required ordi-
33
narily, taking evidence and so on.
Chief Judge Henry Friendly, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, approved the Burdick substitute in a more lukewarm fash-
ion: "Despite my distaste for three-judge courts, I approve this.
It is more acceptable if such cases are heard by a court whose mem-
bers include adherents of more than one political party. 3 4 The third
witness testifying before the Committee, Professor Charles A.
Wright, strongly opposed the Burdick amendment:
[I] question the desirability of retaining the three-judge
court for reapportionment cases. It is certainly true that
these are important cases, but they are cases for which the
three-judge court is particularly ill-suited. The three-judge
court works best in cases that raise a purely legal issue.
It is not well-adapted for cases that require extensive evi-
31. Hearings on S. 1876, supra note 27, at 748.
32. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1374 (1973).
33. Hearings on S. 1876, supra note 27, at 791.
34. Id. at 749.
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dentiary hearings, as is commonly true of reapportionment
cases. 35
The Senate Committee adopted the Burdick amendment. The
above-quoted statements highlight the nature of some of the criti-
cisms directed against the institution of the three-judge court.
The testimony demonstrates the kinds of policy questions involved:
(a) Should the three-judge court be retained in exceptional cases
for strictly political reasons? (Chief Judge Friendly); (b) should the
three-judge courts be retained in some cases when the issues are
primarily legal? (Judge Wright); (c) are they particularly inappro-
priate when evidentiary hearings are required? (Professor Wright);
(d) or are they only inappropriate when the evidentiary issues in-
volved require oral testimony on intent (as is the case in the anti-
trust field), but not when the issues deal largely with historical
data? (Judge Wright).
Possibly, reapportionment cases essentially present situations
in which, in the words of Judge Wright, "the facts are pretty
much statistical, easily available. 36  Nevertheless, the convening
of a three-judge court would still present considerable difficulties
for the lower court machinery. Perhaps, the procedure adopted in
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, enacted December 21,
35. Id. at 774.
36. The Court's adoption of the equal populations of election districts principle
as the standard for reapportionment, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); West-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), has resulted
in a relatively simple test for malapportionment. Consider the use of census figures
to demonstrate the imbalance created by shifts of population in the three above-
mentioned decisions at, respectively, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); 206 F. Supp.
276 (N.D. Ga. 1962); 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). At least initially,
though, the Supreme Court experienced difficulties in sifting through the factual
data. Mr. Justice Clark's statistical analysis of Baker, 369 U.S. at 253, prompted
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reply that "One of the Court's supporting opinions, as
elucidated by commentary, unwittingly affords a disheartening preview of the
mathematical quagmire .. . into which this Court today catapults the lower courts
of this country without so much as adumbrating the basis for a legal calculus as a
means of extrication." Id. at 268. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, objected to the
statistical approach-
[T]he fault with a purely statistical approach to the case at hand lies not with
the particular mathematical formula used, but in the failure to take account
of the fact that a multitude of legitimate legislative policies, along with
circumstances of geography and demography, could account for the seeming
electoral disparities among counties.
Id. at 345. This criticism, however, was apparently answered in Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 579-80. Yet as the dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall in White v. Weiser, 412 U.S.
783, 798 (1973), indicates, whether the district courts involved in reapportionment
proceedings are in fact merely calculators of population figures is doubtful. Cf
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966).
[Vol. 26:32
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1974, might be preferable.37 Whereas the Study proposed the elimi-
nation of three-judge courts in all actions seeking injunctions
against enforcement of federal statutes,3 8 the Burdick amendment
would abolish three-judge courts generally, while retaining them in
the one substantive area of reapportionments, even when the case
involves a federal statute.39
Certain criticisms of a technical nature seem appropriate.
While the Study's section 1374 proposed that actions for declara-
tory judgments be treated identically with suits for injunctions,40
the Burdick amendment did not specifically mention declaratory
judgments.41 Moreover, the Study's proposed section 1376 dealing
with appellate review in three-judge court cases would be elimi-
nated, leaving the review system in its present uncertain form.42
The suggestion of the Study to make the three-judge court a waiv-
able requirement instead of a subject matter issue 43 would not be
adopted. And under the Burdick amendment the first sentence of
the Study's proposed section 1376(b) would be eliminated. Ac-
cording to section 1376(b), appeals from three-judge district courts
granting or denying injunctions or declaratory judgments would lie
to the Supreme Court (as is done under present 28 U.S.C. section
1253). Under the Proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971,
present 28 U.S.C. section 1253 would be repealed, as clearly super-
fluous, by one of the bill's introductory clauses.4 4 That same re-
peal was retained in the 1973 version of S. 1876, 45 perhaps due
to an oversight. In any event, under this new version of the bill,
appeals from three-judge district court decisions challenging or refus-
ing to challenge apportionment situations would lie to the court of
appeals, not to the Supreme Court. Such a solution would seem
inappropriate and, in the First Circuit, which is composed of only
three judges, 46 it would also seem impracticable. Since under pro-
posed section 1374(b)(1) of the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of
197347 the chief judge of the circuit shall designate at least one
circuit judge for the three-judge court, it may be burdensome in that
circuit to find three judges to sit on the panel hearing an appeal
37. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 28, 29 (Supp. I, 1975).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970).
39. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
40. STUDY § 1374, Commentary. See also note 9 supra and accompanying text.
41. Hearings on S. 1876, supra note 27, at 750.
42. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
43. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
44. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c)(1) (1971).
45. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c)(1) (1973).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
47. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1374(b)(1) (1973).
1975]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
from the three-judge district court decision.48 Accordingly, if the
three-judge court is retained, the principle of direct appeals to the
Supreme Court should be reinstituted for the apportionment cases.
IV. JUDICIAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING
THREE-JUDGE COURTS
The Supreme Court's attitude toward three-judge courts is re-
flected by three statements made at different times. Because of the
burdens imposed upon the entire federal system, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in 1941 in Phillips v. United States described the statutory
requirement of the three-judge court not "as a measure of broad
social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enact-
ment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied
as such., 49  In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,50
decided in 1963, Mr. Justice Clark stated that direct appeals to
the Supreme Court "not only place a great burden on the Court
but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Court of
Appeals."5' And in 1974 the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice
White, when sanctioning a restrictive interpretation of the three-
judge court requirement, 52 quoted Mr. Justice Harlan's reference, in
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, to "'this Court's concern for effi-
cient operation of the lower courts,' and 'the constrictive view of
the three-judge court jurisdiction which this Court has tradition-
ally taken'. 53
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
49. 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941). See also Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees
Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98 n.16 (1974); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111
(1965); Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 92-93
(1960); Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 567 (1928).
50. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
51. Id. at 175 n.1 (1963). Contra, Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 151, 174 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562, 595 n.5 (1972) (Burger, C.J., separate opinion); United States
v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 477 n.5 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 364-65
(Harlan, J., separate opinion).
52. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 544 (1974). See Note, Federal Jurisdiction:
Supreme Court Strains to Provide a Federal Forum for Challenges to State Ad-
ministration of Welfare Programs, 59 MINN. L. Rav. 761, 773 (1975).
53. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965), which overruled the
holding of Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), that a conflict
between a state statute and a federal statute pursuant to the supremacy clause is
a sufficient charge of "repugnance to the Constitution of the United States" within
28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970), to require a fhree-judge court. In Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 537 (1974), a challenge on clear constitutional grounds had been joined
with a mere supremacy clause challenge, but, nevertheless, a decision by a single
judge on the supremacy clause challenge was held adequate as a preliminary matter.
But cf., e.g., the earlier case of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913).
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Many narrow interpretations of the three-judge court require-
ment demonstrate these restrictive views of the Court. Thus, the
"statute" to be enjoined under section 228 154 does not include ordi-
nances or statutes having only local application.55 The statutory
provision was held not to govern suits against local officers,56 or
against state officers performing acts of purely local concern.57 In a
court of appeals opinion, the provision was described as a "decep-
tively simple statute. 58  In an earlier Supreme Court opinion it
was held that the three-judge requirement does not apply where it is
merely claimed that the officials are administering a constitutional
statute in an unconstitutional manner.59  Recently, the Supreme
Court construed Section 1253 of Title 2860 very narrowly by holding
that an injunction is not "denied" within the meaning of that statute
(and therefore no direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court) when the
denial is based on the plaintiff's lack of standing.6
Of course, a heavy burden is imposed on the federal judiciary
by the three-judge requirement. In nonmetropolitan areas the re-
quirement to summon a second district judge and a judge of the
court of appeals to sit as a three-judge district court frequently
creates practical difficulties. Also, direct appeal to the Supreme
Court is contrary to the general idea of giving that Court substan-
tial control over its own docket.62  Accordingly, a bill was intro-
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
55. Board of Regents v. New Left Educ. Project, 404 U.S. 541 (1972); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Exparte Public
Nat'l Bank, 278 U.S. 101 (1928); Exparte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928); cf. Alabama
State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Public School and College Authority, 393 U.S.
400, 401 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Wilentz v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen, 306 U.S. 573 (1939).
57. Rorick v. Board of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 208 (1939).
58. Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 1966).
59. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
61. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974). But
see Medguski v. Margolis, 389 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1975). See also MTM, Inc.
v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799 (1975); Fitzgerald v. diGrazia, 419 U.S. 1065 (1974); MTM,
Inc. v. Baxley, supra, at 808 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (statements as to the con-
tinuing value of three-judge courts).
62. In the eight years from fiscal 1963 through 1970 the number of three-judge
courts convened has risen over 125 percent, while from 1969 to 1970 alone the in-
crease amounted to 35 percent. Ammerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They
Run!, 52 F.R.D. 293, 305 (1971). See Hearings on S. 1876, supra note 27, at 749
(Statement by Chief Judge Friendly); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 50 (1970,
Supp. 1972). See also STUDY 317. See the statements by Chief Justice Burger
calling for reduction or elimination of three-judge courts, 61 A.B.A.J. 303, 304
(1975); Report of the Study Group on the Case Load of the Supreme Court, 57
F.R.D. 573, 598 (1972) ("Freund Report"); Boskey & Gressman, Recent Reforms in
the Federal Judicial Structure, 67 F.R.D. 135 at 135, 142 (1975). However, the
tremendous increase in numbers of three-judge court cases appears to have leveled
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duced in 197163 amending present 28 U.S.C. sections 2281 and 2282
that would eliminate the three-judge court requirement. Detailed
provisions would require that notice be given in injunction cases
to the Attorney General and Governor of the State, or to the Attor-
ney General of the United States. According to proposed section
125964 direct appeals to the Supreme Court could be taken by the
State or the U.S. Attorney General, respectively, from district court
decisions granting injunctions against enforcement of statutes repug-
nant to the Constitution; but the Supreme Court, instead of decid-
ing the direct appeal, could remand the case to the court of appeals.65
Apparently, no equivalent to that bill66 has since been introduced.
Rather, the latest attempts to deal with three-judge courts-amended
S.1876 of the 92d and 93d Congresses-have basically followed the
suggestions advanced by the Study.
67
Whatever the future of general revisions of the three-judge
court system may be, legislation was enacted recently abolishing the
system in the expediting mechanism of the Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act68 and in the area of the ICC's orders.69
V. RECENT LEGISLATION LIMITING
THREE-JUDGE COURT JURISDICTION
Of the two acts passed in the closing days of the 93d Con-
gress limiting three-judge court jurisdiction, the first, the Anti-
trust Procedures and Penalties Act,70 seems the more significant.
off. The Court heard 318 such cases in 1971 ("Freund Report," supra, at 598), 310
and 320 appeals in 1972 and 1973 respectively, but only 249 arguments from three-
judge courts in 1974. 1974 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS ANNUAL REPORT IX-44; Boskey & Gressman, supra, at 141-42 n. 11. Whether
this decline is natural or induced by a reluctant Court, see, e.g., note 61 supra, is an
open question.
63. H.R. 3805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in Ammerman, supra note
62, at 313.
64. Id. § 1259.
65. The latter proposal is objected to by Professor Wright. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 50 (Supp. 1972). He argues that the normal appeal to the court of appeals
is preferable; the power of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari of a case before
judgment of the court of appeals would take care of situations where prompt action
of the Supreme Court is highly desirable.
66. H.R. 3805, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
67. See discussion of the Burdick amendment, text accompanying notes 28-48
supra.
68. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A.).
69. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.A.).
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 28 et seq. (Supp. I, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1970).
A substantial portion of its legislative history is reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
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Principally, the Act eliminated the three-judge court jurisdiction
of the Expediting Act, 7' and modified the former system of direct
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court.72  The new statute provides
that upon the filing by the Attorney General of a certificate of
"general public importance" the case shall be expedited. For-
merly, the only appeal from a final decision of a district court was
to the Supreme Court, whether or not the district court had been
composed of three judges." Now, 15 U.S.C.A. section 29 lays
down detailed rules for appellate review of final judgments of dis-
trict courts in antitrust cases brought by the United States seeking
equitable relief. According to subsection (a), a normal appeal may
be had to the U.S. court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. sections 129 174
and 2107,75 and appeals from interlocutory orders may be had under
28 U.S.C. sections 1292(a)(1) 76 and 2107.
But an interesting alternative was provided in 15 U.S.C.A.
section 29(b). A direct appeal to the Supreme Court shall lie un-
der the following conditions: (a) That upon application of a party
filed within 15 days of the notice of appeal the district judge has
within 30 days of that notice entered an order stating that immedi-
ate consideration of the appeal by the Supreme Court is of general
public importance; and (b) that the appeal has been docketed in
the time prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules. Then, the Su-
preme Court may dispose of the appeal in the normal manner pre-
scribed for appeals to the Supreme Court or, in its discretion, may
remand the case to the c.ourt of appeals which shall handle it as if
it had been appealed to the court of appeals like a normal appeal
under the new subsection (a).
There is also a new provision permitting immediate appellate
review of district court rulings on motions for pretrial injunctions
under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1). The former law had per-
mitted no such reviews but had allowed review of injunctions only
& AD. NEWS 6535-46. For a critical view of the new statute, based on doubtful
premises, see Rosett, The Supreme Court versus the District Court in Antitrust Cases,
26 MERCER L. REV. 795, 797, 807 (1975).
71. See Expediting Act § 1, ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 28 (Supp. I, 1975), stating that in a civil antitrust action brought by the United
States a three-judge court was to be convened if the Attorney General certified that
the case was "of general public importance."
72. Expediting Act § 2, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 29
(Supp. I, 1975).
73. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 22, § 105, at 471.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
75. Id. § 2107.
76. Id. § 1292(a)(1).
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after completion of the trial." The amendment, it was stated,
"would possibly conserve substantial enforcement resources and, in
view of the legal issues in merger cases, obviate the need for some
trials., 78 As the Committee Report stated, the "possible direct
Supreme Court post-trial review of litigated government civil anti-
trust cases reflects legislative recognition of the Attorney General's
responsibilities to coordinate national antitrust enforcement pol-
icies," and "the legislative conferral of discretion in post-trial ap-
peals on the Attorney General is expected to increase vigorous en-
forcement of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice. 79
In discussing the ramifications of the new Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act, Messrs. Boskey and Gressman raise two impor-
tant technical points. First, regarding direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court, "it may happen that the appeal is not qualified
under the Expediting Act to be taken to the Supreme Court until
the time for docketing the appeal (which includes preparing and
filing a jurisdictional statement) is about to expire."80 They, there-
fore, urge counsel to seek an extension of the time for docketing
from a Supreme Court Justice. 8' This may be advisable because
although the time limit for docketing an appeal is 90 days from
the entry of the judgment appealed from,82 that time may have been
consumed because (a) the time for filing the notice of appeal is 60
days;83 (b) under 15 U.S.C.A. section 29(b), as amended, the party
who has filed the notice of appeal has 15 days for filing an applica-
tion for the order suggesting a direct appeal; and (c) some time
may, of course, be consumed by the district court in deciding
whether or not to grant such an order. Messrs. Boskey and Gress-
man suggest that, if the docketing rules are not changed, it should
still be assumed that "the entry of the district court's expedited
appeal order would have no effect upon the computation of that 90-
day docketing period. 8 4
Whatever the merits of such an assumption, clarification of the
77. See United States v. FMC Corp., 84 S.Ct. 4 (1963) (Goldberg, J., in
chambers) (application for preliminary injunction denied). See also United States v.
Cities Serv. Co., 410 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1969).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974). This view might be
compared with the earlier opposite view that the abolition of interlocutory appeals
would serve to eliminate the delays inherent in such appeals. United States v.
California Co-op Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929).
79. H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 78, at 11.
80. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 62, at 151.
81. Id. at 151 n.30.
82. Sup. CT. R. 13(1).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (1970).
84. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 62, at 151 n.30.
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time limitation of docketing clearly seems desirable. Such a change
in the Supreme Court Rules recalls the manner in which the
problem of the special appeal procedure of 28 U.S.C. section 1292
(b) was handled. Under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) the district
court and, thereafter, the court of appeals are authorized to permit
certain interlocutory appeals, which may consume the time limita-
tion for notice of appeal. But despite the silence of the 1958 statute
which added 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) to the Code,8 5 and despite
the apparently definite statutory time limitation of notices of ap-
peals (28 U.S.C. section 2107), the problem was handled by adopt-
ing rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure which
stated that when dealing with appeals under 28 U.S.C. section 1292
(b) "A notice of appeal need not be filed." 6  Handling the above-
stated docketing problem under the Expediting Act would seem to
be a less troublesome issue.
There cannot be any doubt as to the soundness of the second
suggestion advanced by Messrs. Boskey and Gressman that counsel
should, in his jurisdictional statement, show why immediate consid-
eration of the appeal by the Supreme Court is important. 7  At-
tention to this suggestion may serve to assist the Supreme Court in
developing case law concerning the special procedure of immediate
appeals to the Supreme Court.
Messrs. Boskey and Gressman look upon the special procedure of
immediate appeals to the Supreme Court, with its discretionary char-
acter, as a departure from the obligatory-type jurisdiction of appeals
which now exists "at least in theory.,8 8  On the ground that the
word "discretion" appears in new 15 U.S.C.A. section 29(b), 9 they
reach the conclusion that under this new class of appeals the Su-
preme Court "is authorized to entertain or not to entertain, on purely
discretionary grounds-just as it grants or denies petitions for cer-
tiorari on discretionary grounds." 90
This conclusion may be doubtful in view of the statement in the
House Report that new 15 U.S.C.A. section 29(b) does not mean
that the Supreme Court is intended to have a free and absolute
85. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
86. FED. R. App. P. 5.
87. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 62, at 154.
88. Id. at 155. That statement, undoubtedly, has reference to the fact that by
its own interpretation the Supreme Court has read into the appeal provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970)-although it is couched in "obligatory" language-the require-
ment that, in order to give rise to an appeal, the federal question involved must be
"substantial." Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 177 (1922); Sup. CT. R. 15(l)(e).
89. 15 U.S.C.A. § 29(b) (Supp. I, 1975).
90. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 62, at 155.
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discretion to hear or not hear a case on direct review.9' It should
be noted that with respect to the similar power of a party to bypass
the court of appeals with the certiorari proceedings of 28 U.S.C.
section 1254,92 the Committee made the statement that it did "not
intend to duplicate that law through its amendment. 9 3  In any
event, the new procedure of 15 U.S.C.A. section 29(b) introduces a
significant new device. A similar device existed in the suggested
section 1259 of Title 28 proposed by H.R. 3805, which had sought
to do away with three-judge courts generally.94 Such a device may
be the means whereby Congress, though eliminating three-judge
courts, will still give effect to the special significance of particular
situations. It is a question of legislative policy whether such a solu-
tion is desirable. Professor Wright objected to proposed section
1259 on the grounds that normal appeals to the court of appeals are
preferable, and that the Supreme Court's power to grant certiorari
before a court of appeals decision covers those situations where an
immediate review by the Supreme Court is desirable. 95 But this
argument fails to recognize that, at least psychologically, the new
device of 15 U.S.C.A. section 29(b) is not the same solution as that
of certiorari preceding a court of appeals decision. Under the new
procedure of section 29(b), the Supreme Court will receive for a
particular determination substantially all cases found by a district
court to be worthy of immediate Supreme Court review, and in sec-
tion 29(b) there is, in the record, a prior district court determination
that immediate consideration by the Supreme Court is appropriate.
Unlike the certiorari proceedings, there will be statements of two
tribunals favoring immediate Supreme Court review.96
A similar emphasis on judicial action is found in the lengthy
section 2 of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act97 which treats
in detail the subject of consent decrees, the all-important and most
frequently used device of antitrust litigation. Formerly, the proviso
of 15 U.S.C. section 16(a) 98 specified that consent decrees in govern-
ment antitrust actions that were entered before any testimony was
taken would not be prima facie evidence for any other party in a
91. H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 78, at 14.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970).
93. H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 78, at 13-14.
94. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 65 supra.
96. See also the procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), concerning appeals
from interlocutory orders. In our concluding chapter we shall examine the continued
existence of three-judge courts, and we shall suggest to what extent solutions like
that of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act might be desirable.
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 16 (Supp. I, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C.A. § 16 (1973).
98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(a) (1973), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(a) (Supp. 1, 1975).
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suit under the antitrust laws against the same defendant. That
provision is retained, but now it is required that together with the
proposal for a consent judgment, there be filed in the court and
published in the Federal Register a competitive impact statement at
least 60 days prior to the effective date of the judgment.9 9 Simul-
taneously, a statement must be filed "for 7 days over a period of 2
weeks in newspapers of general circulation," summarizing the pro-
posed consent judgment, the above-described competitive impact
statement, and listing the documents the United States will make
available for public comment. Written comments shall then be re-
ceived by the United States. After the 60-day period has lapsed,
the United States shall then file in the district court, and publish
in the Federal Register, its response to such comments.'00
Subsections (e) and (f) of new 15 U.S.C. section 1601 deal
with the judicial practices and procedures upon submission of a
proposal for a consent decree. As the House Committee explained,
"One of the abuses sought to be remedied by the bill has been
called 'judicial rubber stamping' by district courts of proposals sub-
mitted by the Justice Department."'1 2 Now, before entering a con-
sent decree, the district judge shall determine whether such entry is
in the public interest. In that connection, the court may consider
the competitive impact of the decree, as well as its impact upon the
public generally and upon individuals alleging specific injury. In
making its determination, the court may take testimony of govern-
ment officials or experts, may appoint a special master, may author-
ize participation by interested persons (including intervention under
the Federal Rules10 3 and examination of witnesses or documentary
99. Such a statement would explain the nature of the proceeding, the practices
giving rise to the alleged violation, the proposal for a consent judgment, the remedies
available to private plaintiffs, the procedures for modifying the proposal, and al-
ternatives considered by the United States. 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(b) (Supp. I, 1975).
100. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 16(b), (c), (d) (Supp. I, 1975). Presently, as a matter of
internal policy only, the Department of Justice has slightly similar but considerably
less specific procedures containing shorter time limitations. The House Report
quoted a statement of the earlier (1959) Report of the House Antitrust Subcom-
mittee, as follows: "The consent decree practice has established an orbit in the
twilight zone between established rules of administrative law and judicial proce-
dures." The new bill, in the words of the House Committee, "is designed to substi-
tute 'sunlight' for 'twilight' and to regularize and make uniform judicial and public
procedures." H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 78, at 6.
101. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 16(e), (f) (Supp. I, 1975).
102. See H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 78, at 8.
103. For the present law concerning intervention of private parties after the entry of
consent decrees, see Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502
(1941) (prior to 1966 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 24); Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 136 (1967) (subsequent to 1966 amend-
ment to FED. R. Civ. P. 24).
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materials), or may review any comments or objections. 0 4  Finally,
new subsection (g) of 15 U.S.C. section 16105 provides that within
10 days of the filing of the proposed consent decree the defendants
shall describe to the district court all "lobbying" communications
made by them or on their behalf to a United States employee, but
"lawyering" contacts by counsel of record for defendants meeting
alone with members of the Department of Justice are exempt.1
0 6
The second recent statute eliminating three-judge court jurisdic-
tion deals with review proceedings of rules, regulations, and final or-
ders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.' 7 The statute is
shorter than the Antitrust statute and is unlikely to create many
problems. Essentially, amended 28 U.S.C.A. section 2342 seeks to
end the peculiar status of the ICC. Many years ago, judicial re-
view of orders of the Federal Maritime Board or the Maritime Com-
mission,'0 8 of the Federal Communications Commission,'0 9 of cer-
tain orders of the Secretary of Agriculture," 0 and of certain orders
of the ICC, required three-judge district courts. But whereas the
so-called Hobbs Act"' abolished the three-judge requirement for
most cases, and in lieu thereof substituted review by the court of
appeals, it did not do so for the ICC. Judicial review of ICC orders
104. The new statute emphasizes the judicial function in the area of consent
decrees. Its purposes are to foreclose, to the extent possible, future disputes con-
cerning the language of the decree or the intentions of the parties (see United States v.
Atlantic Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19 (1959)) and to facilitate future modifications of a
consent decree (see United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971)).
The greater recognition of the judicial function with regard to consent decrees
may be contrasted with the opposite development in the area of the Federal Tort
Claims Act where until 1966 the section dealing with compromises authorized the
Attorney General to settle "with the approval of the court" but the requirement of
court approval was eliminated, since, as a practical matter, the decision to settle was
reached by the Justice Department. Act of July 18, 1966, PUB. L. No. 89-506, 88
Stat. 307 (codified in scattered sections of 28, 31 U.S.C. (1970)). See Jacoby,
The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1220 (1967).
105. 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(g) (Supp. I, 1975).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 1463, supra note 78, at 9, for a description of how this
provision seeks to codify legal ethics.
107. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, PUB. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.A.); cf. text accompanying notes 27-48 supra; S. 1876, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1325(a) (1973); S. 1876, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 1325(a) (1971).
Section 1325(a) seems to have been superseded by the enactment of 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1336.
108. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 451, § 31, 39 Stat. 738.
109. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, Title IV, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1092.
110. Act of June 10, 1930, ch. 436 § 11, 46 Stat. 535; Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32,
38 Stat. 220.
111. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189 §§ 1, 2, 64 Stat. 1129, as amended, 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 2341, 2342 (Supp. I, 1975).
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retained the three-judge district court requirement 12  That special
situation was generally deplored,' 3 and 28 U.S.C.A. section 2342
remedies it.
The new statute brings to the court of appeals proceedings to
enjoin in whole or in part a rule, regulation, or order of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.! 4  No statutory possibility of
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from those court of appeals deci-
sions was created," 5 but the general discretionary certiorari re-
view rule of 28 U.S.C. section 1254(1) applies. Obviously, ICC pro-
ceedings were not considered to present such new, important, and
basicially non-factual legal issues as to suggest an early Supreme
Court determination.
An interesting side-issue occupied a considerable portion of
the legislative history of Pub. L. No. 93-584. That issue, so impor-
tant both for the government and the private lawyer, related to the
control of the litigation on the government's side, viz. whether the
governmental agency's counsel themselves might directly repre-
sent the agency in court, independently of the Department of Jus-
tice. The issue was fully discussed in the statement of Mr. George
M. Stafford, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, to
the House Judiciary Committee on December 10, 1974.6 Mr. Staf-
ford expressed the concern of the Commission "that the first sen-
tence of section 2348 is susceptible of the construction that the
Commission would be precluded from taking a position in a case
independent of and separate from that of the Department or, under
section 2350, filing a petition for a writ of certiorari on its own."''
7
112. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2325, 62 Stat. 970, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2342 (Supp. I, 1975).
113. See, e.g., Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court,
supra note 62, at 597.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2321 (Supp. I,
1975). The great number of three-judge court proceedings involving the ICC was
believed to put too great a strain on the judiciary. S. REP. No. 500, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3 (1973). But jurisdiction was given to the district courts under 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1336(a) (Supp. I, 1975) of any civil action to enforce any order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and to enjoin any order of the Commission for the payment
of money or the collection of fines, penalties, or forfeitures.
Thus, in the case of the ICC, district court jurisdiction is retained for a small
group of less significant cases, Le., cases which usually are not among the ICC cases
of broader significance. From these district court decisions normal appeals lie to the
court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
115. Unlike the Antitrust statute, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 28 (Supp. I, 1975). See notes 68-106 supra.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 1569, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-20 (1974), commenting
favorably on 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2323 (Supp. I, 1975).
117. H.R. REP. No. 1569, supra note 116, at 15. Sections 2348 and 2350 are
part of the Hobbs Act, ch. 1189, §§ 8, 10, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950), as amended, 28
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The House Committee Report dismissed the Commission's fears
as ill-founded. In lecturing to the Commission on the unsoundness
of its position, the Committee took the trouble of quoting the sec-
ond and third sentences of 28 U.S.C. section 2348, which specifi-
cally state that the agency may appear as a party of its own motion
and as of right, and be represented by counsel, and the third sen-
tence of 28 U.S.C. section 2350, which permits- the agency, as well
as the United States, to file a petition for certiorari. " 8
However, that was not the -objection the ICC had. Rather, the
Commission objected that the existing 28 U.S.C. section 2323 states
that, "[t]he Attorney General shall represent the Government,"
' 1 9
while the Hobbs Act, as amended, states that "[t]he Attorney Gen-
eral is responsible for and has control of the interests of the Govern-
ment."
120
U.S.C. §§ 2348, 2350 (1970). The first sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1970) reads:
"The Attorney General is responsible for and has control of the interests of the
Government in all court proceedings under this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (1970)
deals with the review in the Supreme Court on certiorari. See also S. REP. No.
500, supra note 114; text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
118. H.R. REP. No. 1569, supra note 116, at 8.
Arguments between the Department of Justice and the agencies as to who is to
conduct the litigation affecting an agency-the Justice Department lawyers or the
agency's lawyers-are, of course, not new. H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1315-20 (2d ed. 1973); D. SCHWARTZ & S.
JACOBY, GOVERNMENT LITIGATION 26-27 (1963); D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY,
LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 1.123 (1970); cf. FTC v. Dean
Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 116 (1926).
One of the classical highlights in this field is an Executive Order of June 10, 1933,
transferring litigation functions to the Justice Department. Exec. Order No. 6166,
5 U.S.C. §§ 124-32 (1933), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 901 (1970), quoted in Sullivan v.
United States, 348 U.S. 170, 172 n.2 (1954).
Recent highlights include statutes authorizing representation of agencies by
their own lawyers. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(e) (1970) (Securities and Exchange
Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 825m(a) (1970) (Federal Power Commission); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(e), (j), () (1970) (National Labor Relations Board). In addition, a broad
statutory provision reserves, "except as otherwise authorized by law," the conduct of
litigation to the Justice Department. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970). Finally, of course,
administrative practices have developed over the years. D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY,
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION 27 (1963).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2323 (Supp. I, 1975)
(italics supplied).
120. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1189, § 8, 64 Stat. 1129, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2348 (1970) (italics supplied). The Hobbs Act, as amended, specifically safeguards
the separate right of the agency to appear and be represented by its own counsel,
and by what is now 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1970), it grants the agency the rare privilege
of filing its own petition for certiorari. Cf. United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491
(1970) (the Department of Justice taking a view opposite to the Commission).
Without clear statutory authority, the ICC apparently has since 1913 represented
itself before the Supreme Court. Statement of the ICC to the House Committee,
H.R. REP. No. 1569, supra note 116, at 17 n.16. For a broad statement of former
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In lecturing to the ICC, the House Committee concluded that any
activity of the Attorney General abridging the statutory rights of the
ICC "would be subject to challenge in court."12' The Committee
did not specify what the remedy would be, but apparently there
could be no defense of sovereign immunity raised in an action to
force the Attorney General to afford the ICC its statutory right
of independent representation. 1
22
VI. SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT STATUS AND REMAINING
INSTANCES OF THREE-JUDGE
COURT REQUIREMENTS
The efforts to limit three-judge court jurisdiction have been de-
scribed. 123  Several questions occur. Will the reform of federal ju-
risdiction concentrate on so-called organizational matters, as dis-
tinguished from substantive limitations? 124  If so, as seems likely,
should the remaining special statutes which still require three-judge
court determinations be amended first?125 The Regional Rail Reor-
Solicitor General Griswold emphasizing the desirability of the Solicitor General's
rather than the agencies' being ultimately responsible for Supreme Court aspects of
government litigation, see Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Case-
load and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 344 (1975). See
also his testimony at Hearings on H.R. 5050 and H.R. 340 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
(Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1973), 93d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 93-50,
pt. 1, at 272-96 (1973), where he took the occasion of the discussion of section
101(d)(1) of H.R. 5050-which would have authorized the SEC to "conduct in its own
name and through its own attorneys litigation . . . in the . . . Supreme Court"
-to expand upon the importance of the Solicitor General's office. Id. at 285. That
provision of the bill did not become law. For Griswold's specific reference to the
ICC's handling its own Supreme Court litigation, see id. at 293; for the report of
the SEC on the bill, see id. at 117-24. See also 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1970); S. REP.
No. 500, supra note 114, at 6.
121. H.R. REP. No. 1569, supra note 116, at 9.
122. As an incident to court litigation, such a court order would seem to be valid
even in the absence of a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. An analogy could
be made to the validity, even without specific statutory consent, of a court order
directing that a matter is considered admitted if the Government's answer to a
request for an admission is found to be non-responsive. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
123. See notes 13-48, 70-106 supra and accompanying text.
124. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
125. Federal Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. § 9010(c) (Supp.
II, 1972); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973(c), 1973h(c)
(1970), § 1971(g) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-73, 89 Stat. 400; Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-2, 1973bb-2
(1970), as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b) (1970); Regional Rail Reorganiza-
tion Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 743(d) (Supp. 1975) (a statute temporary in character).
The earlier three-judge court requirement in TVA condemnation cases was repealed
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ganization Act of 1973 can be disregarded in this connection since
the entire procedure of that Act is a one-time affair, limited to the
exigencies of a specific situation.
12 6
But should we otherwise follow the example by which three-
judge courts in the Antitrust Expediting Act were abolished?127
In other words, should we abandon the requirements of three-judge
court determinations but provide some form of immediate "obliga-
tory" appeal to the Supreme Court? Should such a possibility be
created where the existence of large, potentially determinative legal
issues, as distinguished from cumbersome factual examinations, may
suggest early Supreme Court clarification? Should a distinction,
such as the one developed by Judge Wright in support of Senator
Burdick's amendment preserving three-judge courts for reapportion-
ment cases, 128 be transplanted as a justification for providing a quali-
fied immediate appeal to the Supreme Court? And if it is so trans-
planted, which of the remaining statutes would seem to warrant
the immediate Supreme Court appeal?
Probably the Voting Rights Act of 1965,129 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1970,130 (as given continued life in 1975), 13 are provisions
in 1968. Act of Sept. 8, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-536, § 1, 82 Stat. 885, repealing 16 U.S.C.
§ 831x (1964).
126. The "Special Court" established by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
of 1973 is not a typical three-judge district court convened by the chief judge of the
court of appeals, but is a three-judge court established by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970); see Regional
Rail Reorganization Act § 209(b), 45 U.S.C.A. § 719(b) (Supp. 1975). The Special
Court, convened in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court, consists of two circuit judges
and one district judge. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102,
at 110-11, n.7 (1974). It was established as a special tribunal to deal with midwest
rail carriers engaged in reorganization proceedings under section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). A decision of the three-judge Special Court
held the Rail Reorganization Act unconstitutional, but the decision was reversed by
the Supreme Court on the ground that proceedings under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491 (1970), are available to provide just compensation for any taking. Blanchette
v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., supra. The procedure under the Rail Reorganiza-
tion Act is so unusual and so much a temporary affair that our general views on the
undesirability of the three-judge court system should not be applied here, especially
since the "Special Court" of the Rail Reorganization Act apparently was not es-
tablished by Congress for political reasons, but rather was enacted as a "one-
time" affair, and as a multidistrict matter.
127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 29(b) (Supp. I, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
128. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 79i (1972).
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973(c), 1973h(c) (1970), § 1971(g) (Supp. II, 1972),
as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-2, 1973bb-2 (1970), as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400.
131. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400.
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which are particularly well-suited to the three-judge court procedure.
The Voting Rights Act seems special principally because the relief
sought is of a generalized nature. Thus, the factual issues are likely
to involve general statistical studies or regional surveys, rather than
particularized facts of individual cases which are so inappropriate
for three-judge court determination. In the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
the clauses requiring three-judge district courts for the determina-
tion of suits brought by the states are either cases where the state
seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that a "test or device' 132
has not "been used during the seventeen years preceding the filing
of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color,"'133 or they involve
cases brought by states seeking a declaratory judgment declaring
that a voting "qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or pro-
cedure" does not have such a purpose. 34 Thus, the determinations
do not deal with individual cases.
135
Similarly, the three-judge court requirements for suits brought by
the Attorney General apply to suits seeking general declarations.
The Attorney General may bring a suit for declaratory judgments
or injunctive relief "against the enforcement of any requirement of
the payment of a poll tax,"'136 or he may seek a finding that a
deprivation of voting rights was pursuant to "a pattern or practice
of discrimination."'137 That the requirement of three-judge courts is
restricted to the general situations involving "pattern or practice"
becomes apparent from the structure of 42 U.S.C. section 1971.
Subsection (c) of that provision deals with the general right of the
Attorney General to prevent a person from engaging in an act that
deprives another person of the right to vote; subsection (e) permits
132. Defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1970), as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203, 89 Stat. 400.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a), as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73,
§ 101, 89 Stat. 400 (1970).
134. Id. § 1973c; see Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1974);
Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1973) (both showing the limited
function of the courts in this respect).
135. See generally statement by Attorney General Katzenbach that the case-
by-case method of enforcing voting rights has been unsatisfactory, at H.R. REP. No.
439, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1965).
Perhaps the almost "administrative" or "executive" nature of such declaratory
judgments is best exemplified by the Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73,
§ 202, 89 Stat. 400, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970), which states that the non-
permissibility of the tests or devices can be established by a determination of the
Attorney General accompanied by a determination of the Director of the Census.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(b) (1970), as amended, Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-73, § 408, 89 Stat. 400.
137. Id. § 1971(g) (Supp. II, 1972).
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the Attorney General to request the court to make a finding
"whether such deprivation was or is pursuant to a pattern or prac-
tice"; and, finally, subsection (g) provides that when such a request
has been made, the Attorney General may make a further request
for a three-judge court. Clearly, the three-judge court is to be insti-
tuted only when the case involves the general finding of "pattern
or practice."'' It would seem that the three-judge court requirements
should be retained, although modifications similar to those of the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 might be sug-
gested.
139
The three-judge requirement in another special statute, the Presi-
dential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971,140 may lend itself
more clearly to modification along the lines adopted by the Anti-
trust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974. Under present law,
determinations made by the Comptroller General in a factually dif-
ficult context under the 1971 Act 14' are subject to review by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
42
but suits to implement the statute by the Comptroller General, the
national committee of any political party, or individuals eligible to
vote for President are to be brought in a three-judge district court.
43
While it may be desirable not to force individuals, who may be lo-
cated anywhere in the country, into a District of Columbia court,
it is questionable whether a three-judge court is the desirable forum.
Implementation of a determination by the Comptroller General po-
tentially involves many factual details and issues; hence, a single-
judge proceeding might be preferable. The obvious political char-
acter of decisions implementing the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act by enforcing the Comptroller General's determinations,
and especially the frequent need for urgent action in such cases,
may make early Supreme Court review very desirable. Adoption of
a procedure like the new appeal provision of the Antitrust Proce-
dures and Penalties Act of 1974144 may be suggested, perhaps with
138. The three-judge court provisions of the 1970 Voting Rights Act include suits
by the Attorney General challenging a "test or device" as a violation of the constitu-
tional right to vote, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-2 (1970), or challenging a denial of the right
of 18-year-olds to vote. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 301, 89 Stat. 400,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb (1970).
139. See notes 70-106 supra and accompanying text.
140. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
141. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9005 (Supp. II, 1972) (conditions for payments to
candidates); id. § 9004 (detailed rules for the entitlement of eligible candidates to
payments).
142. Id.§9011(a).
143. Id. § 9011(b)(2).
144. 15 U.S.C.A. § 29(b) (Supp. I, 1975); see notes 70-106 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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an exhortation that the urgency of the matter shall be a factor in
favor of having the Supreme Court decide the appeal immediately.
Finally, there are some three-judge court provisions in the civil
rights field contained in the chapters on Public Accommodations and
Equal Employment Opportunities. 45  While to some extent their
language is similar to the Voting Rights Act provisions discussed
in the preceding pages, 146 there remain substantial differences
which may justify retention of the three-judge procedure in voting
rights cases but may tend to suggest its abolition in the civil
rights field. The first of the civil rights provisions prohibits discrim-
ination or segregation in places of public accommodation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin;147 the other provi-
sion requires that equal employment opportunities be maintained.
14
In both situations the Attorney General is authorized to bring an
injunction suit against any "person" engaged in a "pattern or prac-
tice of resistance" to the guaranteed rights. 149 Together with a cer-
tificate that the case is of "general public importance" the Attorney
General may then demand a three-judge court. 50
These provisions in the civil rights field seem very similar to
the procedure that existed in the antitrust area prior to the Decem-
ber 1974 amendment;' 5 ' and a similar abolition of the three-judge
requirement, would appear to be desirable. The awkwardness in-
herent in a three-judge procedure is not justified by the fact that the
Attorney General certifies that the case is of "general public im-
portance." And here the finding of a "pattern or practice" does
not, as it does in the voting rights field, imply a generalized
statistical finding more readily suited to a three-judge procedure.
For in the voting rights field it was the "pattern or practice" of the
state that was in question, 52 whereas in the public accommodations
and equal employment sections of the civil rights area, it is a per-
son's "pattern or practice" of resistance to the guaranteed rights
that is being litigated. 153 It is much more likely that the latter area
will contain individualized factual situations inappropriate for three-judge courts. Accordingly, adoption of a procedure patterned after
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b) (1970).
146. The civil rights provisions also talk about "pattern or practice." See notes
133-44 supra and accompanying text.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970).
148. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
149. Id. §§ 2000a-5(a), 2000e-6(a).
150. Id. §§ 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b).
151. See notes 62-106 supra and accompanying text.
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g) (1970) (e.g., literary tests or general voting qualifica-
tions).
153. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(a), 2000a-6(a) (1970).
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the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of December 1974, to-
gether with the special appeal procedure to the Supreme Court,
15 4
clearly seems appropriate in the public accommodations and equal
employment fields.
Turning back to the general statutes requiring three-judge courts
-28 U.S.C. section 2281 (injunction against state statute on ground of
unconstitutionality by restraining action of official) and section 2282
(injunction against federal statute on ground of unconstitutionality)
-it should be noted that the Study would do away with section
2282.' But while the Burdick amendment to the Federal Court
Jurisdiction Act, based on the Study, would also abolish section
2281, it would retain the three-judge court requirement for both
federal and state reapportionment cases. 156  While reapportionment
cases because of their generalized, statistical facts, might tend to jus-
tify convening a three-judge district court, the awkwardness of a
three-judge court procedure in the lower courts cannot be denied
even for reapportionment cases. Instead of resorting to a three-
judge court, perhaps the establishment of a single-judge system and
a qualified immediate appeal to the Supreme Court might be the
desirable solution.
Legislative steps abolishing the special statutory three-judge
court requirements may be expected, and legislative rethinking of the
general rules requiring three-judge courts may be desirable. Such
"organizational" changes' 57 in federal jurisdiction perhaps will be
154. See notes 72-76 supra.
155. STUDY 611.
156. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 748 (1972).
157. Another "organizational" change which may soon be promulgated is "geo-
graphical" legislation recommended by the U.S. Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System. U.S. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL
COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROVISIONS (1975). In
view of the unbearable burden of the caseload in the Ninth Circuit, the Commission
at one point suggested dividing the Ninth Circuit into two circuits, thereby splitting
the State of California into two separate circuits. Id. at 96. Aside from other
problems, such a solution might result in an increased Supreme Court workload.
For instance, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970), whether
an employee was acting "within the scope of his office or employment," 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671 (1970), has been interpreted to be a matter of state law, and even whether a
soldier in any situation was acting in the line of duty is to be determined by the
applicable rules of respondeat superior under state law. Williams v. United States,
350 U.S. 857 (1955). The result of that ruling is to limit substantially the number
of successful certioraris in the Federal Tort Claims field. Compare Williams v.
United States, 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954), rev'd and remanded, 350 U.S. 857
(1955) (decision before Supreme Court ruling), with Williams v. United States, 248
F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958) (decision after Supreme
Court ruling). If the State of California were divided into two separate circuits, the
likelihood of successful certioraris on the basis of conflicting rulings on state law
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promulgated before important "substantive" changes will be en-
acted. In fact, whenever the question of the public importance and
the viability of a three-judge court system appears in the future,
legislators are well-advised to appreciate fully the fact that situations
dominated by complicated issues of individualized facts are particu-
larly ill-suited for three-judge courts. The goal of an early Supreme
Court ruling in those situations might be accomplished by legisla-
tion modeled after the new provisions of the Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act of 1974.
applicable in the interpretation of a federal statute might increase. See Sup. CT. R.
19.1(b) (conflict between court of appeals' decisions on the same matter specifically
listed as the first reason for granting certiorari).
